A.
The demand for newer, better genetic sequences is overwhelming. As soon as a new sequence appears on the many internet forums, it will be lapped up by all the DIY biologists in the hopes that that sequence will finally make their bacteria do what they want it to do. This constant craving for new sequences sometimes makes my job seem like shooting fish in a barrel - I design and test sequences that recognize and disrupt genes classed as ‘potentially hazardous’ and share them online pretending to be some kid in his parent’s basement (what better place to drive advancements in science). After that, I sit back and let the people and the DNA do the rest - disabling potential bioweapons (and natural pathogens) one white lie at a time. The less easy part of the job comes when there’s a bioterror scare and we’re hard pressed to work out what exactly the organism is supposed to do and how we can neutralize it before it can do lots (or any) harm to the people. After all, it would be pretty bad for politicians if there would be nobody left to elect their asses into four more years of luxury.